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Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first tribunal to criminalize forced
pregnancy.1 The Court’s statute defines forced pregnancy as “the unlawful confinement
of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of
any population or carrying out other violations of international law.”2 Although the
concept of a forced pregnancy crime is relatively new,3 forced impregnation has been
used throughout history as a tool of assimilation or subjugation of the enemy, minority, or
slave populations.4 There is some evidence that the ancient Athenians used it as part of
their genocide of the Melians for example,5 and in more recent times thousands of outcast
children were born as a result of the rapes of Bengali women by the West Pakistani army
in 1971.6
Nevertheless, it was not until the mass rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda caught the
attention of feminist legal scholars7 that forced pregnancy began to capture the public
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consciousness.8 Estimates vary but victims of rape gave birth to an estimated 2,000 5,000 “children of hate” in Rwanda and perhaps 400 -600 in Bosnia.9 In Bosnia,
particularly, commentators have alleged that Serbs had a systematic plan to impregnate
Croatian and Muslim women and force them to bear Chetnik (i.e. Serb) babies.10
Catherine MacKinnon railed against a legal system that made states lack of protection for
women internationally protected.11
Against this backdrop, feminist groups united to create the Women’s Caucus for
Gender Justice in the ICC (“Women’s Caucus”).12 The Women’s Caucus was
enormously influential during the planning phases of the ICC, and over the fierce
opposition of some states, was successful in arguing for the inclusion of forced pregnancy
in the ICC Statute.13 While the ICC has not yet tried its first case, the court has gone far
beyond any other international tribunal in recognizing crimes committed against
women.14
Despite the optimism that surrounds the ICC and its recognition of forced
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pregnancy, little attention has been paid to how the crime will be prosecuted. In this
article, I will examine the potential difficulties associated with prosecuting forced
pregnancy. In Part I, I examine the ambiguities in the definition of forced pregnancy as
well as the mens rea and act reus of the crime. A particular problem is that ICC
definition “shall not in anyway be interpreted as affecting national laws related to
pregnancy.”15 Is it possible to make sense of “forced pregnancy” without in some sense
recognizing a women’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy? In Part II, I will
address the different contexts in which forced pregnancy can potentially be prosecuted.
Forced pregnancy qualifies as both a crime against humanity and a war crime under the
ICC statute.16 There are particular challenges to prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime
against humanity and war crime. I will also address the claim that the ICC Statute does
not go far enough - that forced pregnancy is genocide.

Part I: What Is Forced Pregnancy?

A. The Elements of Forced Pregnancy
To prove the crime of forced pregnancy, the prosecutor will have to establish that
“[t]he perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations
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of international law.” 17 This holds true whether the perpetrator is tried for forced
pregnancy as a war crime or crime against humanity.18
As the above definition makes clear, the act reus of the crime of forced pregnancy
is not the rape and impregnation19 but rather the unlawful confinement.20 The perpetrator
of forced pregnancy is the person who confined “one or more women forcibly made
pregnant”21 not the one who necessarily committed the rape.22 As Kristen Boon notes,
“The legal harm of forced pregnancy is that women are kept pregnant by means of
confinement.”23 The confinement must also be “to a certain location”24 and the crucial
period is between the time a woman is thought to be pregnant and the termination of the
pregnancy.25 To be sure, the prosecutor will have to prove that the woman confined was
also “forcibly made pregnant” but in theory a woman could be forcibly made pregnant
through artificial insemination or other modern technology.26 Preventing a woman from
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using contraceptives could be sufficient action to make a woman forcibly pregnant under
the Statute.27
The ICC Statute stipulates that the confinement must be “with the intent of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations
of international law.”28 To prove forced pregnancy, therefore, it is not sufficient for the
prosecutor to show that a woman forcibly made pregnant has been confined. The
Croatian government would not be liable for forced pregnancy, for example, if it
prevented a Croat raped and impregnated by Serbs from securing an abortion because the
government presumably lacked the requisite mens rea. As a practical matter, the intent
requirement places a limit on the identity of the perpetrators and victims - they must be
members or thought to be members of different ethnic groups.29
Forced pregnancy can also be prosecuted when the confinement was committed
with the intent to perpetrate other grave violations of international law.30 This alternate
intent requirement broadens the scope of forced pregnancy considerably because there is
no limit on the ethnicity of perpetrators or victims.31 Unfortunately, the ICC statute does
not explain what it is meant by “grave violations.”32 Presumably the conduct covered
would include confining a forcibly impregnated woman for the purpose of conducting
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scientific experiments as the Nazis did during World War II33 or in order to enslave the
mother and/or child.34 Courts will likely have a great deal of discretion to shape the mens
rea required for forced pregnancy because the ICC Statute does not impose any definite
limitations.

B. Conceptual Problems in the Definition of Forced Pregnancy
The definition of forced pregnancy could be more precise in several respects.
Although it is relatively clear that the act reus is the unlawful confinement, it is not as
clear whether a woman must be forcibly made pregnant with the intent of “affecting the
ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of
international law.”35 A textual reading suggests that only the confinement is subject to the
heightened requirement because a comma separates “forcibly made pregnant” from “with
the intent of . . .” Thus, the prosecutor will not have to explore the reasons underlying a
rape, for example.36 Nevertheless, the ICC Statute could be clearer on this point.
Another important question is what the prosecutor has to prove with regards the
pregnancy itself. Presumably he/she will have to present evidence that the pregnancy
was not voluntary and was brought about by rape, for example. The person accused of
forced pregnancy could, if he chose, produce evidence to show that this was not the case even if he was not the one who impregnated the victim. To prove forced pregnancy,
therefore, it will often be necessary to prove rape by a party not before the court. Given
33
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this, how much evidence will the prosecution have to present on this point? Will the
judges have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a rape occurred to convict the
perpetrator of forced pregnancy?37 Perhaps the ICC will have to try the rape first and then
move on to the forced pregnancy charge. If the rape can be treated as a mere part of the
forced pregnancy proceeding, however, the alleged rapist’s right to be tried in his
presence would appear to be violated.38 He would be denied the opportunity to contest
the claims made against him or put forward the defense of his choosing.39 There may
also be implications for the presumption of innocence.40 Yet, surely every time someone
is accused of forced pregnancy, the prosecution cannot be expected to hold a rape trial as
well. Perhaps the ICC framers assumed that the person who forcibly impregnated the
victim would also be the one on trial for forced pregnancy although, as I have suggested,
this may not be the case.41
The ICC’s forced pregnancy provision also does not specify whether the alleged
perpetrator must know that the woman he is confining was forcibly made pregnant. Is it
enough that he should have known? As a general matter under the ICC statute, a
wrongdoer must have knowledge of all the material elements of a crime42 where
knowledge is defined as “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will
occur in the ordinary course of events.”43 Presumably this means that the perpetrator of
forced pregnancy must be aware that the woman he is confining is pregnant and also that
the impregnation was forcible, whether it occurred through rape or some other means.
37
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Considering that he may well not have been present during the rape, the perpetrator might
argue that he could not know the circumstances of the pregnancy. This argument is more
convincing then it appears at first glance. The court, after all, has to make its own
determination on whether a woman was forcibly made pregnant, and this determination
involves a mixture of fact and law. The court will presumably consider legal concepts
such as “force” and “consent.”44 Wouldn’t a suspect have to have made a similar
determination to “know” that the woman was forcibly made pregnant? The ICC views
knowledge as actual awareness and in forced pregnancy cases, prosecutors might be
hard-pressed to demonstrate sufficient awareness.

C. Relation to National Abortion Laws
Perhaps the most puzzling part of the ICC’s treatment of forced pregnancy is that
the definition “shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to
pregnancy.”45 This language was added to Article 7.2(f) on the insistence of the Vatican
and states opposed to abortion.46 These delegations to the preparatory conference were
concerned that forced pregnancy would be used to supplant anti-abortion laws and
endanger Catholic hospitals that refused to provide abortions.47 This language ensures
that the ICC will not recognize a general right to abortion.
If there is no right to obtain an abortion, then how to make sense of the forced
pregnancy provision in the ICC statute? Rape and unlawful confinement are already
44
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prohibited under the ICC statute.48 Boon argues that that criminalization of forced
pregnancy evidences respect for a woman’s bodily integrity and sexual autonomy,49 but
her argument could just as easily apply in the domestic context to oppose all regulation of
abortion, and yet, the forced pregnancy provision “shall not in any way be interpreted as
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”50 More convincingly, Carmela Buehler
argues that an unwanted pregnancy greatly exacerbates the pain of the rape.51 She writes,
“If she is forced to bear the child as a consequence of her confinement, this is a long
process during which the child will always be a reminder of her ordeal.”52 Others have
speculated that “[p]regnancy may worsen the long-term of impact of rape on the victim
by eliminating any chance of maintaining acceptance by a husband or family.”53 Perhaps
the best way to understand forced pregnancy under the ICC Statute is that women should
be able to terminate “forced” pregnancies54 whereas it is up to individual nation-states to
determine if abortion should be available in other situations.
There are two problems with this analysis. As previously noted, a woman can be
made forcibly pregnant without necessarily having been raped. It seems inadequate to
justify the crime of forced pregnancy, therefore, on the assumption that the crime occurs
pursuant to a rape. Indeed, if Boon is correct, a woman can be forcibly made pregnant
when she is denied access birth control. 55 If this is indeed the case, I find it hard to
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believe that the reason this woman should be allowed to terminate her pregnancy is
because the pregnancy would represent an ongoing reminder of the harm done to her in
denying her access to contraception. The indignity central to the crime of forced
pregnancy is not being forcibly made pregnant - which will usually be punishable as rape
or some other crime56 - but rather that a woman is being forced to carry a child against
her will. If it were otherwise, the Statute would criminalize “forced impregnation” not
“forced pregnancy.”
Second, and perhaps more important, if the ICC Statute recognized a woman’s
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy that was caused by rape, for example, then
the Statute would not have noted that forced pregnancy “shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”57 There is no guarantee that
national abortion laws will not infringe on a woman’s right to terminate a forced
pregnancy. This is hardly surprising as the provision needed to satisfy constituents that
were fervently opposed to abortion.58 Boon argues that most national abortion laws
already recognize an exception for forced pregnancies.59 Even if this is so, however, the
ICC Statute seems to concede that nations have the right to set their own abortion laws,
and this would presumably trump any obligations nations had under earlier treaties or
customary international law.60
The consequence of the forced pregnancy compromise is that the ICC appears to
have created a state action exception in forced pregnancy cases. If nations are allowed to
56
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restrict abortion however they wish, then they can presumably confine women in order to
prevent them from having abortions. A person confining a woman forcibly made
pregnant pursuant to a national law that prohibited abortion, therefore, would be immune
from prosecution by the ICC. If a private individual were to affect the confinement,
however, he too might be immune from prosecution depending on whether his conduct
would be sanctioned by the state.61 The ICC Statute never explains exactly what
constitutes “unlawful confinement” in the forced pregnancy context, and given this, the
ICC seems obliged to consider whether suspects have violated their own nation’s
abortion laws.
This apparent deference given to national law in forced pregnancy prosecutions is
in stark contrast to how other crimes are prosecuted by the ICC. As a general matter, the
ICC will only apply domestic law as a last resort, after having examined the ICC Statute
and international materials.62 A worrying possibility is that the ICC might have to apply
national abortion laws even when they are fundamentally discriminatory or sexist.
While applying such laws is forbidden by Article 21 (3) of the ICC Statute, the fact that
forced pregnancy “shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating
to pregnancy” 63 suggests that the ICC Statute requires that enormous deference be given
to national abortion laws. As a practical matter, it will be difficult - if not impossible - to
charge a person who lives in a society that does not permit abortion with the crime of
forced pregnancy under the ICC Statute. Citizens who live in states where abortion is
permitted would of course be subject to the ICC’s jurisprudence. This disparity can be
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explained by the fact that the core of forced pregnancy is that women cannot be
prevented from terminating unwanted pregnancies, and nations who reject abortion
appear to have been successful in carving out an exception for themselves in the Statute.

Part II: The Manifestations of Forced Pregnancy

The ICC Statute recognizes forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity as well
as a war crime.64 Many commentators have also argued that forced pregnancy is
genocide65 although the ICC does not explicitly treat it as such. Forced pregnancy is
defined identically in Article 7 (the ICC’s crimes against humanity provision) and Article
8 (the ICC’s war crimes provision), but the elements of forced pregnancy differ
depending on the context. There are particular challenges depending on whether forced
pregnancy is prosecuted as a crime against humanity, war crime, or genocide.

A. Forced Pregnancy as a Crime Against Humanity
To be convicted of the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy, the
perpetrator’s conduct must meet the definition of forced pregnancy in Article 7(2)(f) as
outlined above. In addition, the crime must be part of a “widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population”66 and the perpetrator must know that his conduct
was part of or intended to be part of this widespread or systematic attack.67
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The ICC Statute defines “attack directed against a civilian population” as a
“course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts [such as murder] against
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack.”68 Forced pregnancy then must occur against a backdrop of violence
where murder, rape, and other enumerated crimes69 are prevalent. Although there need
not be a full-blown war,70 the attack must be “widespread or systematic” but not
necessarily systematic and widespread.71 This is the case for all crimes against
humanity.72
While the ICC Statute does not define either “widespread” or “systematic,” the
former requirement seems to suggest that an attack must of a relatively large scale while
systematic refers to the element of coordinated planning.73 To prosecute forced
pregnancy as a crime against humanity, therefore, not only must there be the crime occur
as part of an attack, but the attack must be of a large scale or alternatively involve a high
degree of coordination (and the perpetrator must know of the attack and his role in it).
There also appears to be a limit on the identity of the perpetrator because the attack of
which he is a part must be “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy.”74 This would rule out “free-lancers” who decide to commit crimes on their
own.75
Prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity is problematic in a
number of respects. The act reus of forced pregnancy is unlawful confinement and
68
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presumably the confinement could occur away from any widespread or systematic attack
- forced pregnancy is a crime that often occurs in isolation.76 It is conceivable that in
many cases the confiner would be unaware of the circumstances of the systematic or
widespread attack. How can forced pregnancy truly be part of an attack, moreover, when
the unlawful confinement will often occur far away from the original attack?77 While
crimes like murder are often part of attacks on civilian populations, forced pregnancy is
ultimately a crime committed against an individual woman. This has led some to suggest
that the attack requirement must be loosened for sex-related crimes against humanity like
forced pregnancy.78
The ICC Statute also does not address the issue of whether the prosecution would
have to prove that there was a national policy to commit force pregnancies. Without such
a policy, the perpetrator might not be acting “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy.”79 The Statute states that it is the attack itself that must be
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy” whereas the forced
pregnancy merely needs to be a part of the attack.80 But how can forced pregnancy be
part of this attack unless there is at least implicit state approval of the crime? If history is
any guide, prosecutors might be hard-pressed to find the requisite evidence of state
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sanction.81 It will be interesting to see in which instances the ICC will prosecute forced
pregnancy as a crime against humanity.

B. Forced Pregnancy as War Crime
The ICC Statute allows forced pregnancy to be prosecuted as a war crime if the
crime occurs in the context of (or is associated with) either an international conflict82 or a
non-international conflict.83 Forced pregnancy is one of the war crimes in Article 8 that
are “serious violations of the laws and customs”84 of international law but not “grave
breaches” of the Geneva Conventions.85 This does not necessarily mean that the ICC
views forced pregnancy as any less serious than other war crimes, but rather, under the
Geneva Conventions (which form the basis of modern prosecution of war crimes), rape
and other sex crimes are not acknowledged as “grave breaches.”86 The perpetrator of
forced pregnancy must be aware of the factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict whether the conflict is international or internal.87
Armed conflict is not precisely defined under the ICC Statute. However, the
Statue makes clear that “armed conflicts” are not “situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar

81
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nature.”88 War crimes occur only where there is a protracted armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.89 From
this, it seems evident that the ICC is precluded from prosecuting war crimes when there
are not two hostile parties. If a government were to launch an attack on a population that
had not taken up arms, its agents could probably not be charged with war crimes
(although they could certainly be tried for crimes against humanity). This is regrettable
from the perspective of justice, but the ICC only has jurisdiction over persons “for the
most serious crimes of international concern” (emphasis added).90 Presumably domestic
courts could prosecute war crimes such as forced pregnancy that do not occur in the
context of international conflicts or serious internal conflicts.
The elements of forced pregnancy as a war crime are more lax than those of
forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity. The perpetrator need only be aware that
an armed conflict exists - he need not know that there is a “widespread or systematic”
attack or his particular role in the attack.91 The armed conflict and the crimes committed
therein need not be “in furtherance of a state or organizational policy.”92 Moreover, the
forced pregnancy does not have to be committed as a part of the armed conflict93 - it
merely has to be associated with it.94 As long as an armed conflict involves the largescale or purposeful commission of war crimes,95 and the perpetrator of forced pregnancy
had some connection to the conflict, he can be convicted for committing a war crime.
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The ICC’s treatment of forced pregnancy as a war crime would seem to still
preclude prosecuting free-lancers. This is potentially troublesome. If someone takes
advantage of the existence of an armed conflict, where law and order has broken down,
he should not be able to escape punishment simply because his conduct was not strictly
“associated” with the armed conflict. However, given prior jurisprudence before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Court is likely to
interpret the “armed conflict” requirement quite liberally. In Tadic, for example, the
ICTY wrote that there is a nexus between conduct and an armed conflict if an act is not
unrelated to the armed conflict and was not done for the perpetrator’s purely personal
motives.96 Under this precedent, the ICC will likely be able to reach even perpetrators
whose actions were tangentially connected to armed conflicts. Most prosecutions of
forced pregnancy will likely be under the ICC’s war crimes provision.

C. Forced Pregnancy as Genocide
The ICC Statute does not explicitly treat forced pregnancy as genocide. The
Statute lists five acts that constitute genocide when committed with the intent to “destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” and forced pregnancy
is not one of these acts.97 This seems to stand to reason. As one commentator has put it,
“How is it possible to view the creation of human life as genocidal? How precisely is a
group destroyed by the creation of individuals?”98 Moreover, the notion that forced
pregnancy is genocide forces us to ignore several biological realities.99 When a woman is
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forcibly made pregnant with the intent of the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of
a group,100 the ethnic composition of the group is not really affected because the child
will still in part belong to the mother’s group. Children, after all, receive equal parts
genetic material from mother and father.
To some advocates, however, genocide can be equated with the pollution of the
bloodline.101 Catherine MacKinnon has claimed: “Croatian and Muslim women are
being raped, and then denied abortions, to help make a Serbian state by making Serbian
babies.”102 MacKinnon’s argument is that in patriarchal societies like Serbia, where the
ethnic identity is based on the ethnicity of the father, forced pregnancy is used to increase
the population of one group at the expense of the other.103 Siobhan Fisher has put the
point more generally: “When reproduction is used to proliferate members of one group
and simultaneously to prevent the reproduction of members of another, it is a form of
destruction.”104 As long as the victim of forced pregnancy is carrying the child of the
enemy, she cannot give birth to children of her own group, and after she gives birth she
may be too devastated to bear children of her group in the future.105 What is important
then might not be the genetic reality that the children of forced pregnancy belong to both
groups, but rather the perceptions of perpetrators and victims.106
This view has some support in the Akayesu decision before the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).107 In dicta, the Tribunal wrote that forced
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pregnancy can be seen as genocide when it is intended to prevent births within a group.108
The ICTR wrote: “In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined
by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a
group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately
impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child
who will consequently not belong to its mother's group.”109 Like the ICTR, the ICC
recognizes that that the imposition of measures intended to prevent births is genocide.110
Forced pregnancy then, if performed with the requisite intent, could potentially be
prosecuted as genocide under Article 6(d) of the Statute.111
Although the ICC may choose to read Article 6(d) to allow for the prosecution of
forced pregnancy as genocide, there are strong reasons that it should not do so. The
perpetrator of forced pregnancy is able to affect the ethnic composition of a particular
group only if the group views the offspring as a product of “the other.” Carpenter writes,
“To function as genocide, the children (and the mothers who bore children “of the
enemy”) must be seen by the group as alien to the group.”112 To treat forced pregnancy
as genocide is to substantiate the myth that identity is determined solely by the ethnicity
of the father; it is to accept the notion that the mother’s ethnicity is erased from the
offspring.113 Such views have real-world consequences, most notably on the “children of
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the enemy,” who inevitably end up alienated from both cultures.114 The overall treatment
of such children is of deep stigma,115 and the women who give birth to them are often
isolated from their own culture and community.116 The preamble of the ICC Statute
proclaims that the state parties are “conscious that all peoples are united by common
bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage.” Treating forced pregnancy as
genocide is to validate the notion that a child must be ethnically and culturally pure to
belong to a particular people.
The intent required to commit genocide also appears to be at odds with the intent
required for forced pregnancy. To commit genocide, one must have the intent to
“destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”117 To
commit forced pregnancy, however, the perpetrator must have the intention to affect the
ethnic composition of a population or carry out other violations of international law by
means of unlawful confinement.118 The intent required for forced pregnancy is usually
readily inferred from the facts of the confinement. When a pregnant woman is held until
she gives birth to a “child of the enemy” and then let go, this would seem to suggest that
the confinement was for the purpose of affecting the ethnic composition of her group.
The same facts cannot also give rise to genocide unless having the intent to affect the
ethnic composition of a group also means the perpetrator has the intent to “destroy in
whole or in part.” Such an interpretation, however, would turn every war crime and
crime against humanity of forced pregnancy into genocide. Apart from the fact that it is
114
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bizarre to think of a confinement of a person (pregnant or not) being committed with
genocidal intent, the framers of the ICC could not have intended such a result.
Moreover, if one group wished to destroy another, forced pregnancy would
probably not be the weapon of choice. According to one account from a rape camp,
women who were to bear “Chetnik babies” were segregated from the rest, received extra
food and other privileges, and were examined by gynecologists.119 Forced pregnancy is
a horrible crime, but it is hard to read these facts as proof of genocide. Presumably a
group intent on genocide would not confine women of the enemy group and let them go –
they would kill them. MacKinnon has speculated that the idea of forced pregnancy is to
create a “fifth column” in the enemy population, but the children of forced pregnancy can
assimilate and are just as likely to be victims of murder and genocide as anyone else.120
As Carpenter has argued, “It seems conceptually meaningless to rely on the imagination
of perpetrators to label a child’s ethnicity when in fact the child’s experience and identity
may be embedded in a different community.”121 While the ICC is not precluded from
treating forced pregnancy as genocide, there are legal and practical considerations that
justify the ICC’s Statute’s position in not explicitly treating it as such. The ICC should
focus on prosecuting forced pregnancy as a war crime and crime against humanity.
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Conclusion
International courts are increasingly concerned with crimes committed against
women such as forced pregnancy and forced marriage.122 At the same time, the ICC and
other institutions123 have yet to try these crimes. Although it is a welcome development
that the rights of women are no longer of secondary concern to international law, we
cannot be sure how courts will treat these crimes. The ICC will have substantial
discretion in analyzing forced pregnancy because the work of the ad hoc tribunals and
domestic jurisprudence is of limited use in dealing with a crime that has only recently
been recognized.
In this article, I have attempted to demonstrate some of the potential flaws in the
ICC’s treatment of forced pregnancy. In Part I, I focused on ambiguities in the definition,
particularly with regards the act reus and mens rea of the crime. Forced pregnancy is not
actually one crime - but two: There must both be a forcible impregnation and an unlawful
confinement. The perpetrator of forced pregnancy is the one who commits the latter
crime. However, since one cannot be convicted of forced pregnancy without the
impregnation occurring, the prosecution will also have to prove that the former crime
occurred. This is potentially problematic since the rights of third-parties may be
implicated in the proceeding, and it is unclear how much knowledge the perpetrator of
forced pregnancy must have as to the origins of the pregnancy. We also have every
reason to question whether the Statute’s deference to national abortion laws is appropriate
122
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given that the criminalization of forced pregnancy is supposed to protect a woman’s right
to not be pregnant against her will.
In Part II of this paper, I turned to the special difficulties posed in prosecuting
forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity and war crime. Given the special nature of
forced pregnancy, it will be hard to prove that the crime was committed as part of a
“widespread or systematic” attack. The perpetrator who confines the victim may have a
credible argument that he is unaware of the particulars of any attack, let alone that his
action was pursuant to any organizational policy. Indeed, treating forced pregnancy as a
crime against humanity moves the inquiry away from the harm done to an individual
woman to an inquiry into an individual’s complicity in a larger unlawful scheme.
Prosecuting forced pregnancy as a war crime is not as problematic since the perpetrator
need not be furthering some governmental policy - his conduct simply needs to be loosely
associated with an armed conflict. We can expect to see most prosecutions of forced
pregnancy to be under the war crimes provisions of the ICC Statute.
Lastly, I argued that while forced pregnancy can potentially be read as genocide
under Article 6(d) of the ICC Statute (i.e. as a measure intended to prevent births in
another group), the ICC should be reluctant to treat forced pregnancy as genocide.
Forced pregnancy contributes to the destruction of a group only to the extent that we
accept the notion that children must belong to one group or another. While forced
pregnancy is a horrible crime, the action of detaining a woman so she can be forced to
give birth does not rise to the level of genocide, and courts will be unlikely to infer
genocidal intent from the facts of a forced pregnancy. Forced pregnancy inflicts very real
pain on individual women, but it has little to do with the destruction of a group.
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In criminalizing forced pregnancy, the ICC is sending a clear message to the
world that women cannot be treated as mere “vessel[s] of reproduction.”124 At the same
time, many challenges await the court as it begins to prosecute forced pregnancy. The
ICC must strike a balance between vindicating victims and respecting the rights of
suspects accused of this new crime.

124

See Carpenter, supra note 7, at 443.

24

